Edward R. Morey

Professor Emeritus

Environmental Policy When Market Structure and Plant Locations are Endogenous


Journal article


James Markusen, Edward R. Morey, Nancy Olewiler
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 24, 1993, pp. 69-86

DOI: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069683710053?via%3Dihub

Semantic Scholar DOI
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APA   Click to copy
Markusen, J., Morey, E. R., & Olewiler, N. (1993). Environmental Policy When Market Structure and Plant Locations are Endogenous. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 24, 69–86. https://doi.org/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069683710053?via%3Dihub


Chicago/Turabian   Click to copy
Markusen, James, Edward R. Morey, and Nancy Olewiler. “Environmental Policy When Market Structure and Plant Locations Are Endogenous.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24 (1993): 69–86.


MLA   Click to copy
Markusen, James, et al. “Environmental Policy When Market Structure and Plant Locations Are Endogenous.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 24, 1993, pp. 69–86, doi:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069683710053?via%3Dihub.


BibTeX   Click to copy

@article{james1993a,
  title = {Environmental Policy When Market Structure and Plant Locations are Endogenous},
  year = {1993},
  journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
  pages = {69-86},
  volume = {24},
  doi = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069683710053?via%3Dihub},
  author = {Markusen, James and Morey, Edward R. and Olewiler, Nancy}
}

Abstract

A two-region, two-firm model is developed in which firms choose the number and the regional locations of their plants. Both firms pollute and, in this context, market structure is endogenous to environmental policy. There are increasing returns at the plant level, imperfect competition between the "home" and the "foreign" firm, and transport costs between the two markets. These features imply that at critical levels of environmental policy variables, small policy changes cause large discrete jumps in a region's pollution and welfare as a firm closes or opens a plant, or shifts production for the foreign region from/to the home-region plant to/from a foreign branch plant. The implications for optimal environmental policy differ significantly from those suggested by traditional Pigouvian marginal analysis.